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MrNm M STANDARDS oF JuDickL AmImSTRATION. Edited by Arthur
T. Vanderbilt. Published by The Law Center of New York University
for The National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949. Pp. -xxii, 752.
$7.50.
THIs is a valuable book upon a specific but important area of legal ac-
tivity. It will be of no interest to those lofty souls of our profession who look
down upon the plebeian subject of court procedure. It will be anathema
to those vigorous iconoclasts who regard "procedural reformers" as in
league with the devil in trying to preserve and make workable an outworn
system. But to a large group of active workers it will be a vade mecum of
professional activity throughout the nation directed toward the improve-
ment of court structure and court administration. This group is indeed an
ever increasing body; hardly a bar association now fails to be somewhat
permeated by the spirit which first found definite recognition in the fed-
eral rules of procedure and now is embodied in the movement for the in-
tegrated courts. And it is handy to have at hand the definite story illustrated
by maps conveniently picturing the states from dark to speckled to white on
the basis of the extent to which they have accepted the various recognized
steps in procedural reform. Even the most chauvinistic state legislator can
hardly fail to be somewhat impressed to observe the blackness of his own
state thus contrasted with the snow-white condition of near neighbors.
The method of preparation of this volume was somewhat unique. It
represents the conclusions from what is termed a factual survey of all the
states conducted through seven or eight questionnaires to "state reporters"
under the auspices of the Junior Bar Conference of the A.B.A. This in-
volved the enlisting of the activities of a very wide group of persons all over
the country. It also had the advantage of giving a reflex of court procedure
and administration not merely as found in books, but as adjudged by per-
sons of some competence in the local field. The returns were tabulated and
checked by competent people and were then edited for this volume. Ob-
viously the final task of editing would be both as onerous and as important
as, indeed more so than, any other part of the work. It is interesting that
here the only person who seemed immediately able to undertake the difficult
job was the leader in the movement from the beginning, the distinguished
law teacher, practitioner, bar leader, and now head of the judicial system
of a reformed state, the Chief Justice of New Jersey. It is always a matter
of amazement to see how much a single leader can accomplish; it is doubly
so when one person combines so many activities of leadership so successfully
as in this case. But he himself demonstrates the truth of his own statement
here: "Manifestly judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded or for
lawyers who are afraid of temporary defeat." And we are all in his debt.
This method of study of procedure has the advantages indicated of tend-
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ing to avoid overoptimistic conclusions from observing statutes and court
rules alone. I suspect, however, that it contains a certain optimism all its
own, because the state reporters must naturally be those interested in the
subject; and that means only optimists. So far as I can see, however, the
statements are in general judicious and restrained. For example, as to
court rule-making in Connecticut, where the State Judicial Council has
somewhat exuberantly stated that "the legislature has gone 80 per cent of
the way" ' (a statement which overlooks that the final distance is by all
odds the hardest, and doubtless also the longest of all), the statement and
map in this volume list the state as one of crossed lines, quite properly show-
ing only limited grants of rule-making power as to certain proceedings or
in certain courts.2 The great value of the volume is in any event for the
over-all picture in each state, which, like a jury's verdict, may be expected
to be pretty correct even though individual details may be less so. The
various topics considered are those definitely recommended by the Section
of Judicial Administration of the A.B.A. and in substance appearing in that
section's pamphlet, Handbook on the Improvement of the Administration
of Justice. The two will make a proper combination, the pamphlet stating
the program and this book pointing to the degree of its execution in the
states.
One can easily take exception to certain details of the program even if
one has general sympathy with its over-all aspects. Thus the reviewer is
not convinced that the Association's "Missouri Plan," which tends to
freeze selection of judges in a select group of successful practitioners, may
not prove too limitedly conservative for continuing public satisfaction.
But such differences in detail hardly deserve airing here where warm ap-
proval of the very substantial professional activity reflected in this volume
seems more in order. Its reach may, just possibly, extend eventually to a
state such as Connecticut, where the some 400 courts and 2,000 personnel
of the "minor" and probate systems well illustrate the need of procedural
reformers after all. Since I have often had occasion to object to the steady
conservatism of our greatest professional organization, it is a special pleasure
to pay tribute to its worth-while program and accomplishment in this field.
The several notable leaders thus developed, themselves led by the editor
of this volume, are continuously affording evidence to disprove the teaching
of the English experience that the hope for court reform rests entirely with
the laymen.
CHARLES E. CLARKt
1. ELEVENTH REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CONNECTICUT 7 (1948).
2. MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 100, 104, 105 (1949).
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
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THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE. By Edmond N. Cahn. New York: N. Y. Univer-
sity Press, 1949. Pp. 186. $3.50.
REASON AND LAW. By Morris R. Cohen. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press,
1950. Pp. 211. $3.50.
THESE are both "slim volumes", but they are more provocative than
many a weightier tome in their field. The style and content of each is quite
different. Yet they address themselves largely to the same key questions in
legal philosophy, and their answers may fruitfully be compared.
But first a more general word about the two books. The volume by M. R.
Cohen is another of his posthumous publications-a collection of articles and
speeches. The heart of the volume consists of two law review articles, one
on fundamental ethical notions in relation to the criminal lawI and one
which examines absolutist ideas in law and ethics.2 Both are meaty con-
tributions. The latter article attacks various forms in which absolutism
manifests itself, e.g., in the realm of definitions, in divisions of the law (e.g.,
into civil and criminal, substantive and procedural), in the attempt to set
up "self-evident" principles or unqualified ethical notions whose limitations
or difficulties in application have been inadequately appreciated. The crim-
inal law article critically analyzes the numerous theories of punishment,
stressing among other things the limitations upon the "crime is a disease"
approach (in view of the lack of basic knowledge on the determinants of
human behavior, the tremendous cost of an individualized rehabilitation
program, the apparent public need for giving vent to resentment and horror
through the present largely retributive system), limitations on the fashion-
able view that punishment does not deter, and various other interrelation-
ships of legal and moral concepts in the criminal law. Reprinted also is the
brief summary of Cohen's jurisprudential approach which appeared in the
My Philosophy of Law Symposium in 1941 ;3 an essay on Kant's legal phi-
losophy,4 which served to clarify for me a long-standing confusion over the
meaning of that metaphysician's obscurities; a short piece on Italian Legal
Philosophy - which suffers, I think, from the negligible attention paid to the
many insights of the great Pareto; a hitherto unpublished paper on the
"Sanctity of Law" containing little that is not contained in the others;
two relatively minor addresses; 6 and seven book reviews, the most important
1. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J. 937 (1940).
2. Cohen, On Absohtisms in Legal Thought, 84 U. OF PA. L. P~v. 681 (1936).
3. MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw (1941).
4. It is a contribution to THE HERrAGE OF KANT (1939).
5. Cohen, Italian Contributions to the Philosophy of Law, 59 H/ne. L. Rnv. 577
(1946).
6. One is on Legal Philosophy in the Americas, presented at the Eighth American
Scientific Congress (1940) and published in its proceedings, VoL 10, p. 501 (U.S. Dep't
of State, 1943). The other is on Jurisprudence as a Philosophical Discipline, presented
to the American Philosophical Association and published in 10 Jo. OF PI.. 225 (1913).
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of which are those giving a pretty severe analysis of Fuller's The Law in
Quest of Itself (1940) 7 and Robinson's Law and The Lawyers.8
Professor Cahn's book, too, stems from prior writings, but the two law
review articles I forming the basis of the work have been revised, and con-
siderable new material has been added. Prof. Cahn declares it to be his pur-
pose to present an "anthropocentric view of the law." Legal abstractions
or concepts, he says, have "engrossed the attention of legal philosophers
at the expense of what is vibrant, fleshly, and individual"; the meaning of
any concept should be "investigated by observing the occasions when that
concept becomes relevant to the homely experiences of individual human
beings." He chooses as concepts which "can be expected to cast the clearest
light on the nature of law" the "classic antitheses of legal theory . . . Jus-
tice and Power, Freedom and Order, Security and Change." (pp. 1, 2)
Basic to the analysis is the notion that to begin on the foundation of ex-
perience and observation one should begin with the sense of injustice:
"Where justice is thought of in the customary manner as an ideal mode or
condition, the human response will be merely contemplative and contem-
plation bakes no loaves. But the response to a real or imagined instance of
injustice is something quite different; it is alive with movement and warmth
in the human organism. . . . Nature has thus equipped all men to regard
injustice to another as personal aggression." (pp. 13, 24). Various occasions
for exercising the sense of injustice are presented (e.g., the demand for
equality, for dignity, for conscientious adjudication, etc.). Analyses of the
concepts of freedom and security (involving broad-stroke sketches of some
areas of law) lead to the conclusion that they too are closely connected with
the sense of injustice.'0 Throughout the book the "anthropocentric" ap-
proach is exemplified by the attempt to put concepts in a human context, as
in the discussion of the secondary role of legal rules in the judicial process, 1
7. The review appeared in 36 ILL. L. Rv. 239 (1941).
8. The review appeared in 22 CORNELL L.Q. 171 (1936).
9. Cahn, Justice, Power and Law, 55 YALE L.J. 336 (1946) and Freedom, Order and
Law, 23 N.Y.U. L.Q.R. 20 (1948).
10. "When we came to consider the species of human mobility which is called 'freedom,'
we discovered that it involved a series of tacit assumptions concerning man, truth and law.
Those assumptions seemed to float out of reach of earth, until we observed how the sense
of injustice, like a sturdy cable, held them down and maintained their connection with the
native capacities of men." (p. 177).
As for Security, obedience to the sense of injustice can "supply us with firm footing,
with social support .... The experience of the sense of injustice is itself the greatest of
all species of social transformation, because it incites men to join with one another and to
participate-first in the perception of jeopardy, then in the resistance, and finally in the
exultations of an achieved success. These are all public acts of solidarity.... Justice as
a working process creates its own cumulative rewards in every emergent occasion. Among
these are freedom, cohesion, and mutual confidence .... There is . . . the certain op-
portunity that men may, through exercise of the sense of injustice, draw closer and
become everywhere increasingly secure." (pp. 178, 186).
11. See pp. 33-6.
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the suggestion of particular biological bases of the urges for freedom (p. 53)
and for security (p. 130), the discussion of how the legal concepts and pro-
cedures of the governors in their turn cultivate and develop the sense of in-
justice of the governed (pp. 118-20) or serve (e.g., by the degree to which
perils and liabilities of various types are limited, privacy afforded, and the
incidence of change reasonably controlled) to strengthen or weaken their
general feelings of security (pp. 133-50) or otherwise affect security by
affecting their sense of guilt (pp. 152-9), or their feeling of individual
identity (pp. 159-63), or their impulses away from strict conformity to
legal requirements (pp. 163-6), or the sense of affiliation and protection
which comes from membership in community or nation (pp. 166-73).
One way to assay these two books is in terms of the language factor. The
incisive and earthy lucidity which has characterized Morris Cohen's other
writings is present in this work, too. Cahn's style, on the other hand, is not
the kind normally regarded as most effective for an analytical, argumenta-
tive essay in socio-legal theory. It is a poetic style full of imagery. There
is not a great deal of detailed elaboration of the major themes; the legal
references are generally treated not with precise particularity but sugges-
tively and in the large, as though the audience were already learned in the
ways of the law and would know what the author had in mind. But even
some lawyers in the audience will (like myself) wonder at some points.
This is not to deny that the partial sacrifice of precise communication has
greatly augmented the standing of the work as expressive literature.
There is another aspect of the language factor which deserves mention.
One of the irritating things about the history of jurisprudential writing is
a.recurrent and largely unnecessary controversy over definilimts (of such
terms as "law", "justice", etc.). If one is giving a dictionary-type of defi-
nition (i.e. one which purports to reflect usage) the sensible way to resolve
the controversy is to consult the dictionary. If the definition-maker is
giving a stipulational type of definition (i.e. stipulating the meaning which
le-irrespective of usage-is assigning to the word throughout the particular
discourse in which he is engaged), then, again there need be no controversy.
Obviously such a stipulation is neither true nor false. If the definition-
maker is attempting to give a truthful description of some agreed entity
(e.g., a horse), there may properly be a controversy over the truthfulness and
completeness of the description-but beware of such purportedly truthful
and complete descriptions where the entity (unlike the horse) is not an agreed
one, but some abstraction which may or may not symbolize exactly the same
thing to practically all people and hence cannot be given a description which
is verifiably true and complete. Beware also of the type of definition which is
defended as truthfully giving some inherent essence of a word; this is a relic
of primitive word-magic.'12 Morris Cohen is dearly aware of the relativity
12. I have attempted a more elaborate analysis of definitions in an article on juris-
prudence in a forthcoming issue of the MICHIGAx LAw REVIm.
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of definitions. He is further aware that some definitions are more useful
than others, and in particular that it would avoid confusion not to depart
too far from common usage. 13 Cahn does not concern himself explicitly with
definitional theory. While he would doubtless agree with Cohen's obser-
vations, I think it well to indicate that some of Cahn's phraseology is such
as might suggest an assumption, however unintended, of "inherent" mean-
ings of words. 1
4
A tendency in jurisprudential literature, as in most polemical literature,
is to overstate one's opponent's case and thereupon demolish the over-
statement. There is some evidence of this in both Cohen and Cahn, insofar
as they indulge in the popular sport of flogging the "positivists". Cahn
observes (p. 10) that there is a modern "attitude of extreme positivism ...
The business of the jurist, we are told, is to look at the law as given and to
study its day-to-day operations in the courts and administrative agencies.
Other considerations are matters for politics, sociology, or ethics; juris-
prudence cannot solve the enigmas of justice and injustice, progress and
regression, so it should be satisfied to explain the law in terms of an existent
13. "What is law? If we recognize that a definition is a resolution to use a word in
a certain sense, we need not argue as to which is the proper definition of law; we may
only ask whether any given definition is consistently followed and whether the meaning
of the word used is always clearly indicated. And if we view definitions as attempts to
state briefly the essential nature of any actual or historic object such as the law, we must
recognize that a diversity of such definitions is possible because different writers are con-
cerned about different parts or aspects of it." (p. 2).
"If we ignore the facts of actual historic usage, a definition is a resolution to use a
word as a sign or symbol for a certain object and involves no necessary assumption that
the object exists in nature." (p. 67).
"Regard . . . for common usage is a counsel of prudence or practical wisdom." (p. 67).
"The meaning that words acquire in common usage becomes generally habitual and
Humpty Dumpty's notion that we can by the fiat of arbitrary definition make any word
denote anything we please, is far more vain than most New Year's resolutions to change
our habits, since it is hard for any writer or speaker to change also the habits of his
readers or hearers." (p. 167). "Definitions . . . can help us to grasp more clearly the
fundamental ideas or patterns in any field of study and thus serve to create a definite point
of view or perspective for the organization of our subject matter. In this respect some
definitions are more helpful than others." (p. 68).
14. "But mobility has a polar aspect that suggests its inner meaning. Not all move-
ment wins regard.' (p. 67) (Italics added). Doubtless all that Cahn intends to say is
that his meaning of the term is a qualified one; that he is referring to mobility towards ap-
proved destinations.
"The romantic school came somewhat closer to the meaning of freedom." (p. 52).
Again, I think all that Cahn intended to say was that the romantic school came closer to
that point at which Cahn deemed it desirable to place the boundaries of social restraint.
"... . [T]he search for the meaning of justice appears to have been given up." (p. 11)
(Italics added). Evidently Cahn has in mind that what has been given up is the careful
attempt to determine (a) which specific legal arrangements will further the particular




going concern. It should describe, but not attempt to evaluate".15 In the
same way, Cohen (pp. 78-9) attributes to "the younger American jurists"
who adopt Holmes' famed definition of law (the one in terms of predictions
of what the courts will do) a failure to concern themselves with the problem
facing the court rather than the counsellor; i.e., "the problem of the court
is not to predict what it will do but how the case should be decided" in the
light of consistency with generally recognized principles (p. 79). They
allegedly neglect the Ought for the Is. And yet it is obvious that Holmes'
definition did not prevent him from recognizing, examining and discussing
the "Ought"-even though such considerations would have to be given a
label other than "law". And it is equally obvious that the "younger Amer-
ican jurists" referred to have been at least as active as their brethren in
concerning themselves with what the law ought to be, that they are quite
aware that judges' decisions embody some "ought" and that their concern
for the separation of the Is and the Ought is for such separation only during
the process of examining the Is. 16 This is exactly the kind of separation for
which Cohen himself argues forcefully at several different points in his book.
In other words it seems to me that both Cahn and Cohen have set up some-
thing of a straw man.
With the "principle of polarity" the name of Morris Cohen is often
associated-and the application of it in the present book is not dissimilar
to one aspect of Cahn's approach. Cohen advises "trying to save the truth
in opposing views by drawing the proper distinction which enables us to
harmonize them." (p. 65) He criticizes the viewing as either opposites or
identities, of law and justice, fact and theory, logic and experience, and
other such couplings, as well as the tendency to ignore one at the expense
of the other (pp. 1-8, 15, 142-3). 17 He constantly counsels examining all
the opposing factors, avoiding half-truths, seeing that easy generalizations
are appropriately qualified. He had pointed out many years before, that
"the function of intelligence is not only to recognize but also to evaluate
opposing forces, and to determine their resultant with the highest attainable
accuracy. Only in that way can we, in part at least, mitigate the perpetual
and cruel swing from one extreme error to its opposite." 18 So too Cahn in
explaining his choice, as chapter-headings, of Justice and Power, Freedom
and Order, Security and Change, points out (p. 2) that the "life of any re-
15. See also p. 128.
16. See, e.g., McDougal, Fuller v. The American Legal Realists: An Intervenlion,
50 YALE L.J. 827, especially 834-6 (1941).
17. An extension of this point of view, including its application to philosophic per-
spectives in general is eloquently presented in the recent article by Morris Cohen's dis-
tinguished son. See F. S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YAxF. L.J. 238 (1950).
18. CoHEN, LAW AND) THE SOCiAL OmEP, vii (1933). See also the following in his
REASOx AND NATURE 426 (1931) : "Universality and individuality, justice and the law,
the ideal and the actual, are inseparable, yet never completely identifiable. Like being
and becoming, unity and plurality, rest and motion, they are polar categories. Deny one
and the other becomes meaningless. Yet the two must ahays remain opposed."
13771950]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
flective undertaking has been shown to consist in the clash and conflict of
hostile principles; i.e. in the persistent antitheses of the particular field. The
collision of force with opposing force is what sheds flying sparks of illumina-
tion. That is why the ideal is habitually set off against the positive, identity
against time, the free against the determined, reason against passion."
A final basis for comparison is the fundamental ethical theory of the two
authors. The outlines of Cohen's position are quite clear: (1) The ethical
ought is to be distinguished from the is, and cannot logically be deduced
from the latter (since an ought-conclusion cannot logically be deduced from
premises containing no ought) (pp. 6-7; 179). (2) The usual ethical maxims
(e.g. equality, giving each man his due, etc.) are too indeterminate or am-
biguous to be very valuable (p. 7, 21-2). (3) The values and interests to be
compared and harmonized are incommensurable; we not only lack a common
denominator for the different values or interests but we do not regard every
individual's interest on the same basis (those remote in time, space, social
group, etc. are normally regarded differently) (pp. 28, 93-7). (4) Even if
ethical maxims were not ambiguous, they are not unchanging, but rather
exhibit great variety in different times and places (pp. 23-6). (5) There are
limitations on the capacity of law to bring about a just social order (e.g.,
because of diversity of interests between the governing and the governed) 10
(pp. 97-101). (6) In spite of these difficulties it is both possible (p. 181) and
necessary (p. 97) to organize logically an ethical system which involves
(a) "knowledge of natural causal relations which determine what means are
necessary for certain ends," 20 and (b) "a critical consideration of what is
ultimately good or worthwhile and for which we ought to strive. Such a
19. This had been elaborated in REASON AND NATURE (1931) as "the intractability of
human materials." (p. 420). Cohen there included in his discussion the lack of necessary
knowledge on the part of the legislators and their imperfect power to control judicial
interpretation; resistance on the part of the governed to law enforcement in certain fields
of human life; the frailties of human officials; and the possibility that an attempt to effec-
tuate an apparently just objective may on the whole do more harm than good. In addition
to the intractability of human materials Cohen had listed among the difficulties in evolving
a theory of justice, the "indeterminateness of jural ideals" (pp. 415-20), which is men-
tioned in the text above, and the "abstractness of legal rules" (pp. 425-6)-the inability
of the law to depart much from an abstract uniformity in spite of individual differences
among the governed.
There is an interesting discussion of the latter point in Prof. Cahn's book (pp. 159-
63) including reference to the "reasonable man" standard and the practical leeway afforded
by the reactions of juries and officials.
20. The point had been explained in REASON AND NATURE as follows (pp. 441-2):
"If I wish to preserve my health I must take account of the laws of physiology. But
ought I always to preserve my health? That depends on some further assumptions. If
I value the safety of my country, my family, or my own creative artistic activity, I may
answer in the negative. And so, ethics may be viewed as dealing with hypothetical im-
peratives which condition a rationally coherent plan of life. Such a science directly en-
lightens us only as to necessary means, but in so doing it clarifies the choice of ends by
showing what is involved in such choice. We can better decide what road to take if we
know what we can reasonably expect on the way. While, therefore, rational science can-
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system may be called a rational art rather than science." (p. 181). (7)
Such a system will enable us to determine whether we are "mistaken as to
what ends we really think worthy of achievement", and "we can make prog-
ress at least in the clarification of our ideas." (pp. 90, 91). (8) The foregoing
necessarily means a rejection of any absolute standards unrelated to the
postulated needs of the particular society. "To kill the patient in order to
follow the rules of hygiene is no more absurd than to ruin a society for the
sake of observing a supposed rule of justice. Even the divinely ordained
Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath." (p. 101).
Note the limited character of the claims for this proposal. Cohen knows
there is a role for science in the field of instrumental oughts in 6 (a) above-
i.e. in verifying whether a particular ought will in fact achieve a particular
desired end-but that the determination of the ultimate oughts (i.e., what
these desired ends shall be) is not a matter of science at all. All that he can
say of this determination is that it demands a "critical consideration" (and
presumably it should pay some heed, in a democratic society, to majority
,feelings and needs in the matter.) This is a matter of "free" choice rather
than scientific evidence; nor are we able to make the choice between com-
peting ultimate oughts (e.g., economic vs. spiritual values) on the basis of
any common denominator of ultimate oughtness. It is possible, however,
that "ethical judgments can be verified if applied to long spans of human
experience." (p. 181).
Professor Calm would, I think, agree, in spite of indications here and there
which might suggest a more absolutist position.21 Certainly he recognizes
not give us absolute moral rules, it is, like mathematics, inherently applicable to the actual
world."
21. Thus, in observing that "the aspect of equality" in the sense of injustice "shows
itself in the proposition that no human being, however exalted, may lawfully cause the
death of an unoffending neighbor, however insignificant, even to save his own life." (p. 29),
he cites the famous case of Queen v. Dudley, [1884] 14 Q.B. 273, where seamen were
convicted for the murder of another whom they devoured because of hunger, and also
United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 360, No. 15, 383 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842), where the
homicide conviction was for throwing people overboard in order to lighten the load on
a leaky boat. The following observations seem pertinent here: (1) As Cahn notes else-
where (p. 118), the death sentence in the Dudley case was commuted by the Crown to 6
months imprisonment. (2) The grand jury refused to indict Holmes for murder, but
indicted for manslaughter carrying a ma-dmum penalty of 3 years, and he ,as sentenced
to only 6 mos. (having waited 8 mos. in jail). (3) Stephen, in 2 HisTony oF TnE CnnM=,AL
LAw OF ENG Ar D 108 (1883), after referring to the situation involved in the Holmes case
and to the classical hypothesis of two drowning men struggling for a plank which can
support only one, says "it is impossible to suppose that the survivors would be subjected to
legal punishment." (4) The Holmes court seemed to think the homicide could be justified
if lots had been drawn as to who should go overboard. I mention these considerations to
show the highly ambiguous and controversial character of such a standard as the above
"equality" standard-and that Cahn's use of it without explicit recognition of such charac-
ter in this conte-xt might suggest to some an acceptance of an illusory absoluteness. But as
indicated in the text above, the conclusion would be unfair.
Cf., however, the discussion (pp. 113-14) of the Willie Francis double electrocution
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fully both the relativity and indeterminacy of the ethical ideals which he
finds suggested by the sense of injustice (equality, desert, dignity, conscien-
tious adjudication, containment of government within its proper functions,
fulfillment of common expectations). The kind of rationalistic calculus
suggested in 6 (a) above for Cohen's position is not foreign to Cahn's "sense
of injustice" for he is using that phrase to represent "an indissociable blend
of reason and empathy. It is evolutionary in its manifestations. Without
reason it could not serve the ends of social utility, which only observation,
analysis, and science can discern. Without empathy, it would lose its warm
sensibility and its cogent natural drive. . . . Is the sense of injustice right?
Certainly not, if rightness means conformity to some absolute and in-
flexible standard. . . .Blended as it is of empathy and reason, its correct-
ness in particular cases will vary greatly, for how can we know that the
intellect has understood and that projection has comprehended every last
relevant factor?" (p. 26)." . . . [T]he sense of injustice may be and
frequently is applied mistakenly. And even when its exercise is correct
according to the measure of the known facts, certain critical data may not
be known or may not yet exist to become susceptible of knowledge ...
But . . .we can slowly learn to record some of the habits of its vicissitudes
and to manipulate them with cumulative craftsmanship." (p. 184)
Thus, while both authors are more concerned with the normative than the
existential aspects of law, and while both may be described as ethical rela-
tivists, Cohen's emphasis is on logical system and the power of reason which
must be brought to bear on our moral impulses. Cahn's emphasis is on that
"inner conviction" (p. 26) which suffuses the moral impulses, but which, he
recognizes, stands subject to rational correction and systemization. In
exploring, with flashing insight and beauty of phrase, the part which those
impulses play in our law and the ways in which they may in turn be affected
by the law, he has written a book which the author of Reason and Law
could have endorsed. That, to me, is praise of the highest.
SAMUEL MERMINt
case, Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), where Cahn explicitly recognizes the fact
of controversy among the justices, and asserts that the court "failed" by making too low an
estimate of its role as educator of the sense of injustice. But a consistent theory of justice
which.considered not only the psychology of retribution but also the psychology of deterrence
might sanction the second electrocution. So, too, Cahn's point that the sense of injustice re-
volts against different treatment for five different violators of the same legal standard (p. 14)
is not correlated with the point recognized later (p. 111) that penal theory may be directed
toward achieving "reformation of the criminal by preparing him for a new existence of so-
cial usefulness.' I.e., modern notions of individualization of punishment run counter to the
idea that "as human integers, men are indistinguishables." (p. 15). Thus, a rational theory
as distinct from an emotional response (though the reformation objective may not be wholly
free from "emotion") makes debatable this "fixed star .. .of an anthropocentric jurispru-
dence: [that] nature has made man a prime which positive law cannot justly differentiate."
(p. 15).
t Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma.
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THE GROWTH OF AmER IAN LAW. By James Willard Hurst, 1950, Boston.
Little, Brown & Co., pp. xiii, 502. $5.50.
THIS is a work so broad in scope and so new in concept as to make categori-
zation and description difficult. It is the first of a contemplated multi-
volume series under the general heading of its title, with the particular sub-
heading "The Law Makers" for this volume. The "law makers" are
constitutional conventions, legislatures, judiciaries, executives, and the bar.
If we take the publisher's word for it, this is a legal history. But it is
not a legal history in any conventional sense. The development is not chron-
ological, and the emphasis on modern or contemporary description is heavy.
At the same time, it would be misleading to describe it as a survey of the
modern scene. Summation can be put in two ways: This is a historical
description of American legal institutions, with heavy weight on events of
the past 30 years; or, this is a description of contemporary American legal
institutions, with real historical depth and perspective.
Statements of an author's fundamental theory are sometimes given in a
preface, sometimes in a conclusion. Hurst has chosen the latter, and there
he accepts the theory of John Calhoun ("our only first-rank political thinker
of mid-nineteenth century"), that "ITihe central job of law was to bring
power into balance sufficiently so that particular blocs could not run rough-
shod over other interests in society." Hurst continues, "At one time or
another law in the United States dealt with tensions that traced to differ-
ences in religion, race, color, and social class. But no factors bore so power-
fully upon the legal order, or so much shaped its problems, as the main
currents in the growth of the economy." Operating with this principle,
he states his own thesis: "To trace the manner in which legal institutions
had dealt with the resulting tensions in one field of public policy after another
was the central theme for legal history in the United States. To that theme
this volume forms an introduction."
Hurst's work is, as he puts it, "not a study made chiefly from original
sources. . . . The general purpose is to interpret already available, but
generally scattered materials." And yet description in terms of secondary
materials or in terms of such familiar institutional structures as bench or
bar may sell a good book short. This is no conglomeration of the kind of
facts that political science texts might cluster around such labels as "the
judiciary." It is social history and description with appraisal and criticism.
No reader will escape substantial new information or substantial new ideas
from the volume as a whole; and very few readers will be so expert even on
one of the subdivisions as to learn nothing from the particular parts with
which they are most acquainted.
In short, Hurst has created a genuinely new work. A check with some of
my brethren more familiar than I with the literature on constitutional
conventions and courts shows that there is no close approximation of the
description Hurst gives of those institutions. The legislative and executive
branches have been the subject of such extended discussions elsewhere that
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Hurst subordinates their combined treatment here to less than a quarter
of his book. The novelty and scope of the bar section will appear from the
discussion below.
Hurst's sources are secondary, as he says, but they are also certainly
"scattered," and oftimes are obscure. A random opening of the volume,
for example, shows a two page excerpt on lawyers' incomes. The supporting
bibliography actually used in that two pages is 13 works, including nine
biographies, one firm history, one treatise, one law review article, and one
government survey. (For ease of reading, all references are neatly accu-
mulated in a 20 page pile at the rear of the book so that he who wishes may
ignore them.)
Neither Hurst nor his publisher tells us what audience is contemplated,
probably because the work is sufficiently novel so that they didn't precisely
know. It is well written, and reads easily and quickly. The bar, generally,
can enjoy it; Hurst himself uses it as a text in American legal history course;
and I have used it for the same purpose. Professor Van Hecke of North
Carolina is planning to assign it in the first year "introduction" course, and
the book should have great usefulness for this now almost universal part of
the curriculum. Correspondence with teachers about to begin courses in legal
history shows that the existence of this general text is stimulating the de-
velopment of American legal history as a distinct and separate study.
There is not space in a book review for profitable survey of a work which
ranges so widely, and, certainly without derogation of the remainder, I may
be able to suggest the flavor of the whole by concentrating on a few thoughts
occasioned by one section. For my students and for me the most interesting
part of the volume is that third of the book on the bar. The outline of that
section is appended in the note.'
Hurst's discussion is both descriptive and critical. The account of the
growth of bar associations, for example, is no song of praise, though it is
not as severely descriptive of some American Bar Association activities as
1. Hurst's outline of the bar chapters is as follows:
Chap. XII. The Character of the Lawyer in United States Society
1. Popular attitudes toward the bar. 2. The place of the bar in the social structure.
3. The distinction of a professional education. 4. Standards of admission to the bar.
5. Bar associations.
Chap. XIII. The Uses of the Bar
1. The types of law practice
(a) The subject matter of law practice. (b) Lawyers' skills.
2. The economics of the legal profession.
(a) The size of law firms. (b) The overhead cost of legal service. (c) The
division of labor at the bar. (d) Lawyers' Incomes. (e) The "Overcrowded" bar.
(f) Lay competition for law business. (g) Ethics and economics.
3. Social functions of the bar
(a) Individual and corporate contributions. (b) Social Inventors. (c) Master of
fact. (d) Administrators of social relations. (e) The bar as a source of leader-




would seem to me warranted; the description of the "overcrowded" bar also
includes an account of the legal work which society needs but which is never
done; a history of legal ethics highlights the manner in which ethics have
served our pocketbooks.
One comment on legal education in this section on the bar is worth quoting
because it reflects the theory of the whole book. Hurst observes that "Lang-
dell contributed greatly to legal education", and fairly documents his point;
but he goes on to score the "narrowness" of Langdell's methods: "The
radical defect of the case method, when it was treated as a self-sufficient
principle on which to form a law curriculum, was that it isolated law study
from other threads in the pattern of United States society. Corollary to this
root defect, Langdell's method involved grave limits when it was considered
simply as technical training for the practice of law." The legal training of
John Quincy Adams, described by Hurst with reference to his readings, had
some long advantages over a good deal that schools have offered since.
Presumably Hurst wants his book to add some wholesome 18th Century
balance to 20th Century unduly case-focussed education.
The Hurst chapters on the bar are unquestionably the best synthesis
available on this subject. They therefore underline the limited amount of
material available about the profession.
There is real paradox here. Ours is a paper-using profession. Call us what
you will-the inheritor of the tradition of the village letter writer; the
"precision artist with words", to quote someone; long-winded old gas-bags
on paper, if you want to take another view of it. We are a profession specially
trained to "make a record". Yet while we make the records for the com-
mercial community, we do not make them for the profession itself.
Each lawyer can put the matter to the test in his own experience. Take,
for example, the very questions Hurst tries to answer, and apply them to any
community: exactly what do lawyers do in the course of making a living?
Do they handle property transactions, commercial matters, government
business? What abilities are most in demand? How large are law firms?
What are the incomes of the profession, and how are they distributed? How
is the bar regarded by the community, and why? What socially useful ser-
vices does the bar perform, and where are its greatest failures and suc-
cesses? Today's lawyer has some knowledge on each of these matters in his
own geographic area; but how much will an historian in the year 2050 be
able to discover about the role of the bar in the life of the society of our
own times?
Hurst's work demonstrates that the sources of history of the bar are so
limited that it is unlikely that we will ever have information on a number
of subjects. Take, e.g., the controversy over the respective merits of an
appointive and elective judiciary. Lawyers commonly have strong opinions
as to the respective merits of each. Evidence is not available on which ex-
ponents of either view can actually prove their point. When one is through
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ticking off a few judges or a few episodes, satisfactory or unsatisfactory,
under each system, he is pretty well out of information.
This is no mere matter of antiquarian's regret; it means that we have let
a century of experience be wasted, thus losing the benefit which experience
might lend to judgment. One of the recurrent themes of Hurst's book is
that with legal institution after legal institution, one state follows another
without either an attempt at or a basis for intelligent choice.
We are, of course, improving the sources of knowledge. We are not leav-
ing 2050 as dependent as 1850 left us on fat-backed, flossy-papered glorifica-
tions of "The Bench and Bar of . . . .", or on the necrologies and memorial
services which, it must be conceded, have not greatly improved in the
century past. We make more and more studies of current bar problems;
more and more biographies, surveys, and statistical compilations. The
superb reports of the Administrator of the United States Courts, for example,
are at least giving us some idea of the extent and nature of federal litigation.
But in one branch of professional self-acquaintance, we make very little
progress. Each firm has its own unwritten and uncollected history, which is
rapidly being lost in time. Any one such history may be of no great im-
portance by itself; but to the extent that it is part of community or profes-
sional history, it may have significance far beyond the individual miniutia
which make it up. Skilled workmen can put the little facts together to make
a significant whole.
The information shortage is illustrated in the Hurst book by the fact that
when this author of a general history reports the evidence shown by "the
office dockets of leading law firms in a moderate-sized Illinois city at three
intervals from the 19th Century on", he has used up all the detailed informa-
tion readily available on that subject for the entire Mid-West.
There are some published firm histories. As Hurst fairly says, Swaine,
The Cravath Firm, "stands pre-eminent for its rich sources on the flow of
business through a great, busy law office of the 19th and 20th Centuries",
and he has used it freely. At the same time that the value of the Cravath
work for reference purposes is conceded, its loneliness in the field is accentu-
ated. Hurst perforce cites it eighteen times, and has nothing comparable
to use as a source.
This is not the place to assess the strengths and weaknesses of particular
firm histories, which can unquestionably range from high value to near
worthlessness. The central point here is that the use to which Hurst has
put the Cravath work (despite its substantial limitations) shows how a
firm history can, for its good qualities, be brought into the general stream
of historical literature.
Both for themselves, and to permit further general writing in American
legal history, we need more firm histories. Many materials are available,
though space problems have of course forced destruction of many records.
The problem of maintaining proper respect for privacy is not greater than
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in other branches of detailed economic and social history. Three steps are
in order:
1. Firms with rich histories, either on dissolution or from time to time,
ought to turn quantities of their records over to libraries. Whenever pos-
sible, a sifting job ought to be done by the firm and the library at the
moment of transfer to reduce collections to manageable size. The organized
bar might well set up small historical committees, charged with the duty
of searching out manuscript collections for historical societies, a project
which Hurst is now promoting in Wisconsin for the State Bar Association
and the State Historical Society.
2. Public spirited firms ought to publish, in book or article form, histories
of their own. Since for such firms the expenditure of time may be an even
greater handicap than the expenditure of money, experiments should be
made by firms to create research scholarships, appropriately guarded to
insure scholarly standards, whereby collaborative work might be done on
the history of the donor firm. Hower, The History of an Aderlising Agency
(1949), a work done in collaboration with the Harvard Business School,
shows the use of this technique in a related field.
3. The universities ought to encourage graduate students to write theses
in this field.
Needless to say, this is not an adjuration to scholarly advertising, to
pompous glorification, or to dreary recitals of how partner A begat partner
B begat partner C, and so on. If these works are to take their place among
real sources of American history, they must answer questions worth asking.
One of the uses of Hurst's work is in the implicit suggestions it can give
someone undertaking a firm history.
Professor Hurst is at work on the outstanding original research now under
way in American legal history-studies in the legal and economic develop-
ment of the Mid-West. He interrupted those studies to prepare this volume,
bringing the talents of scholarship to an original discussion of American
law. He presents the first integrated discussion of his subject in a manner
which should prove of substantial value to students and the bar.
Jom P. FxLWt
FEDERAL PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE WITH Foiuis. Rules Ed. Civil and
Criminal. By William W. Barron and Hon. Alexander Holtzoff: St.
Paul and Brooklyn: West Publishing Co. and Edward Thompson Com-
pany, 1950.--vol. $70.50.
IT is finally possible to review at least one volume of this new treatise
which was "announced" last November 14th. The set was originally sup-
posed to contain "five or more volumes," I and it will apparently be "more,"
I Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Inside back cover, 86 F. Supp. Adv. Pt. No. 1 (Nov. 14, 1949).
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for the publisher concedes that "it is now definitely certain that . . . [the
entire work] will require at least six volumes." 2 How many of these will
deal with the rules of civil procedure and how many with the criminal is
difficult to tell, but we are promised a thorough treatment of both with
an index and forms to boot.
Since this treatise presumes to present "a complete picture of the federal
practice under the rules and acts of Congress," 3 it seems fair to compare it
with others in the same field such as illoore's Federal Practice and the
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure.
Nine hundred sixty-seven pages of text and footnotes are contained in
Volume I of the Barron & Holtzgff. The first 205 deal with "procedural re-
form generally," jurisdiction, venue and removal. A comparison of thp page
coverage of each of these subjects by the B & H and the Cyclopedia is tn-
favorable to the former:
B & H Cyclopedia
4




The B & H treatment of many matters seems overinclined to brevity.
Diversity jurisdiction, for example, is disposed of in 69 lines of text which
with footnotes cover 7 and Y3 pages. 5 The Cyclopedia's handling of the
same subject requires 126 pages and is adequate. Students of procedure will
note that in this connection the B & H states 6 the important rule 7 of
Strawbridge v. Curtiss 8 without telling the reader -where it comes from. The
case is mentioned only in a quotation from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
majority opinion in City of Indianapolis v. Chase National Bank.' And this
quotation is used by the B & H with two footnotes "I as an exclusive device
to present, without discussion or comment, "the doctrine governing the
alignment of parties" 11 as set forth by the Supreme Court. Most practicing
attorneys will be disinclined to accept this as wholly sufficient.
To the problem of whose citizenship controls as between real, rather than
nominal or formal parties, the B & H devotes eight lines of text,1 2 correctly
2. Pamphlet accompanying volume 1, signed "The Publishers."
3. Preface, p. ix.
4. Not including at least 150 pages in the pocket supplements on the same subjects.
5. §26.
6. Text accompanying n. 95 to § 26.
7. Diversity jurisdiction cannot be sustained unless there is complete diversity between
all plaintiffs on the one hand, and all defendants on the other; i.e., no plaintiff may be a citi-
zen of the same state of which any defendant is a citizen.
8. 3 Cranch. 267 (1806).
9. 314 U.S. 63 (1941).
10. Nn. 96 and 97 to § 26.
11. P. 59.
12. Pp. 59 and 60.
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stating-the judicial views on the most common types of cases. But the read-
er's humor will not be bettered appreciably by use of the terms "class ac-
tion", "unnecessary parties," and "indispensable parties" when they remain
undefined. 13 Nor is any distinction made between true, hybrid and spurious
class actions.
Under "Federal Question" jurisdiction, it is said that "[a] federal question
is presented in any case in which the correct decision depends on the con-
struction of the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States or on the
validity of a statute or treaty." 14 This is only accurate when qualified
by the rule that "[tihe existence of a federal question is to be determined
from plaintiff's pleading, unaided by any defenses interposed or anticipated."
Although this qualification is set out by the B & H, 15 it is not nearly so
forcefully stated as an inviolate rule ought to be. There is not even any
discussion of how it was evolved, and the principal case cited for its sup-
port 11 is a per curiam opinion itself barren of any reasoning on the point.
Moreover, the hurried or harried attorney may be deceived into thinking
that as a practical matter the point is ordinarily about as important as the
following statement which appears in the text seven lines later: "A case
arising under an Indian treaty is within federal jurisdiction." 17 1 am at a
complete loss to understand this curious emphasis.
Under the heading of venue one of the more interesting practical problems
surely deserving treatment is the applicability of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. The B & H treats this subject in 4 and 34 pages,'1 of which one
third consists of a long quotation from Mr. Justice Jackson's opinion in
Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert.9 This case is cited as "An authoritative
definition and explanation of the doctrine . . ." -  (of forum non convcn-
iens), which it may very well no longer be. The reader ought to be told in
so many words that it was decided before the adoption of the transfer pro-
vision in the 1948 Title 28 revision. The alternatives in Gulf Oil were (1)
hearing the case where it was, and (2) dismissal of the action. The latter is
no longer an alternative in such a situation, because there is now a transfer
provision designed to preclude hardships which may attend dismissal, and
this fact may modify the very part of the Gulf Oil opinion quoted. Professor
Moore's Commentary on Ihe U. S. Judicial Code explains all this and more
in an 11 page analysis giving an exhaustive background of the new pro-
vision. 2' The B & H contains no such analysis-only conclusions better
drawn by the reader from statutes which ought to be reprinted.
13. Pp. 60 and 61.
14. Text accompanying n. 64, § 25.
15. Text accompanying n. 72, § 25.
16. Peytonv. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.S. 350 (1941).
17. P. 53.
18. §87.
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While it may be that forum non conveniens is not the most important
thing in the world, it must be conceded that even the practicing lawyer is
concerned with the question of what law is to be applied in the federal
courts. Since 1938, this issue with respect to non-federal matters has
centered about the Erie doctrine, 2 which in such cases requires the federal
courts to apply state substantive law. It must now be agreed that in terms
of judicial interpretation, the Erie Railroad has carried Tompkins all over
the country somewhat in the manner of a derailed locomotive gone berserk.
Where it will go next no one knows, but this is no excuse for omitting a
record of its previous peregrinations. Nevertheless the B & H contains no
extended discussion of the Erie doctrine in spite of its immense importance.
Whether this is because of its complexity or simply oversight I do not know,
but the B & H contains only scattered and casual references to the fact that
this matter or that is procedural or substantive. Compare the Cyclopedia's
323 page 23 treatment of this subject; the B & H omission then becomes
almost as startling as it is uninformative.
The Rules Themselves
Rules 1 through 16, covered in the last 762 pages of the B & H, are prob-
ably the least difficult of all the rules to understand. The complicated prob-
lems which they pose number exactly three: first, the effect produced on the
statute of limitations by the filing of a complaint (Rule 3); second, juris-
dictional troubles arising on the filing of a counterclaim (Rule 13); and
third, problems of jurisdiction and venue arising under Rule 14 in third
party practice. Compare the page coverage of these rules in the Moore, with
that in the B & H:
Moore B &H
Rule 3 47 13
13 106 59
14 117 38
One of the less simple problems under Rule 14 is the question of when
impleader is available by and against the United States. Professor Moore
treats this issue in 9 pages; 24 the B & H in only four lines.25 I infer from
these comparisons and a reading of the texts that the B & I- leaves rela-
tively unexplored some of the problems which are more difficult to handle.
And the B & H treats badly two other matters of interest. The appellate
review of pre-trial orders, for example, is not discussed at all; Professor
Moore devotes 7 pages to it."6 Moreover, an interesting but only slightly
22. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
23. Not including over sixty pages in the pocket supplement on the same subject.
24. 3 Moore, FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948) 14.29.
25. Text accompanying n. 16, § 422.
26. 3 Moore, FEmD.AL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948) 16.21.
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complicated question under Rule 8(c) is butchered for absolutely no reason.
I want to treat it in some detail simply as an example of the cursory treat-
ment accorded matters which may easily be understood with the aid of a
little background. The problem is this: does the Erie doctrine relieve a
defendant of the necessity of alleging and proving contributory negligence,
which is labelled an "affirmative defense" by Rule 8(c), where state law
requires the plaintiff to allege and prove its absence? If the defendant need-
lessly raises it as an affirmative defense, he may be saddled with the burden
of proving it, under the doctrine of invited error. But if he is required to
raise it and does not, he may be deemed to have waived it as an issue. The
practical answer to the dilemma is both obvious and correct: the party
having the burden of proof on the point ought to have to raise it proce-
durally. Since burden of proof is "substantive" for the purposes of the
Erie doctrine,2 it should fall to the plaintiff to allege the absence of con-
tributory negligence in the federal courts where he would have to do so in
a state court. The absence of contributory negligence is part of his cause of
action, something like the death of the deceased in an action for wrongful
death. Though the proper conclusion is stated well enough in the B & HI,
it is supported with a confusing footnote 2 containing a quotation erron-
eously described as propounding the same rule, which it simply does not.
Rather, it takes the position that the defendant ought always to have to
raise the issue, no matter who has the burden of proof. In short, the text
is sound and the "supporting" footnote is not. But how is the reader to
know? If he were told that the Erie case was decided after the promulgation
of the rules of civil procedure, he might be able to figure out for himself that
the rules were not made up with Erie in mind, and that the sensible solution
can be reached in spite of the language in the rules. He would also know
from such a chronology that the statement in the text that "[ilndeed it
may fairly be assumed that Rule 8(c) was intended to apply only in those
cases where contributory negligence is an affirmative defense under the
applicable state substantive law" 2- could not possibly be accurate unless
the rule-makers were using a crystal bail. And he would finally tumble to
the idea that, as Professor Moore puts it, "the Erie case calls for a re-exam-
ination of the problem of what are affirmative defenses." So much for all
this contributory negligence.
So far as the overall treatment of Rules 1 through 16 is concerned, Pro-
fessor Moore treats in 1118 pages what Barron and Holtzoff cover in 762;
in so doing he cites 7355 cases to their 5637 (approximately). The Moore
seems to me to have a good deal more text in it per page and although the
27. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) ; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 303 U.S.
208 (1939).
28. N. 27, § 280.
29. Pp. 514 and 515, §280.
30. 3 Moore, FEmRA PRAcrcE p. 1687, f 8271] (2d Ed. 1948).
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Moore pages are physically smaller than those in the B & H, absent foot-
notes both would contain the same number of lines (45).
Certain Other Matters
There is one thing about the Barron and Holzoff which makes it truly
an astounding work: in spite of the fact that it has been advertised as
"completely new [and] . . . personally prepared by outstanding author-
ities," 1 its footnotes in countless instances consist of nothing but re-
productions of headnotes taken (oddly enough) from the publisher's stand-
ard reports. In some instances the headnotes have been doctored to make
better sense by removing phrases such as "with respect to first cause of
action" and others of similar heavy import, but often they are just quoted
verbatim. Where this is done, of course, the footnote is exactly as reliable as
the headnote. Following are some of the footnotes and headnotes arranged
so that the discerning reader can detect the similarity. I have made no
attempt to track down all of the recidivistic elements lurking in this volume,
but I have no reason to believe that they are not scattered throughout.
Barron & Holtzoff
Footnote 29, p. 667:
"Where question of whether banks
and realty companies were indis-
pensable parties, because of certain
agreement, might well depend upon
surrounding circumstances, and
where because of such uncertainty,
and other issues raised by pleadings
giving rise to factual issues, it would
be more equitable to have a hearing
on the merits before deciding such
issue, motion for dismissal of com-
plaint because of failure to join such
banks and realty companies would
not be granted. Van Kirk v. Camp-
bell, D.C.N.Y. 1947, 7 F.R.D. 231."
Headnote to case cited
Headnote 6:
"Where question of whether banks
and realty companies were indis-
pensable parties, in respect to first
cause of action, because of certain
agreement, might well depend upon
surrounding circumstances, and
where because of such uncertainty,
and other issues raised by pleadings
giving rise to factual issues, it would
be more equitable to have a hearing
on the merits before deciding such
issue, motion for dismissal of com-
plaint because of failure to join such
banks and realty companies would
not be granted. Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, rule 12(b)(6), 28
U.S.C.A. following section 723c."
See also identical text in 31 Fed-
eral Digest, part 3, 1950 supplement
page 62.
31. See inside front cover, 86 F. Supp. Adv. Pt. No. 1 (Nov. 14, 1949).
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Footnote 86, p. 797:
W"here patent action involved
use, manufacture or sale of stabil-
izers by customers of defendant who
defended the action, defendant's
action for use, manufacture or sale
by plaintiff of stabilizers which
allegedly infringed defendant's pat-
ent did not arise out of the "trans-
action or occurrence" so as to re-
quire that defendant set up his coun-
terclaim in plaintiff's action. Clair
v. Kastar, Inc., C.C.A.2d, 1944,
138 F.2d 828."
Footnote 28, pp. 809 & 810:
"An informer's qui tam action
under 31 U.S.C.A. § 231-233 and
former § 234, being remedial and
seeking restitution to the govern-
ment of money taken from it by
fraud is not subject to Rule 13(a) (b)
permitting a counterclaim against
the opposing party notwithstanding
the withdrawal of the government
from the action, since to permit such
a counterclaim would be a strong
deterrent to genuine informer's ac-
tions and since to permit a counter-
claim would be contrary to public
policy. U. S. e-x rel. Rodriquez v.
Weekly Publications, D.C.N.Y.
1947, 74 F. Supp. 763."
Headnote 5:
"Where patent action involved
use, manufacture or sale of stabil-
izers by customers of defendant who
defended the action, defendant's
action for use, manufacture or sale
by plaintiff of stabilizers which
allegedly infringed defendant's pat-
ent did not arise out of the "trans-
action or occurrence" so as to re-
quire that defendant set up his coun-
terclaim in plaintiff's action. Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
13(a), 28 U.S.C.A. following section
723c."
See also identical text in 51 Fed-
eral Digest, 1950 supplement page
117.
Headnote 3:
"An informer's qui tam action
being remedial and seeking restitu-
tion to the government of money
taken from it by fraud is not sub-
ject to the federal rule permitting a
counterclaim against the opposing
party notwithstanding the with-
drawal of the government from the
action, since to permit such a coun-
terclaim would be a strong deterrent
to genuine informer's actions and
since to permit a counterclaim would
be contrary to public policy. 31
U.S.C.A. §§ 231, 232; Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 13 (a, b),
28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c."
See also identical text in 31 Fed-
eral Digest, part 2, 1950 supplement
page 70.
It does not seem unfair to conclude that this reproduction is a direct con-
sequence of the fact that (as the publishers put it): "The editorial staff of
the U. S. Code Annotated has lent its exceptional facilities and experience
to the authors, enabling them to examine, with the utmost thoroughness,
every pertinent decision on every phase of the law." 12 I have an idea that
one of two things is true: either the staff lent a good deal more than its "facil-
32. See inside back cover, 86 F. Supp. Adv. Pt. No. 1 (Nov. 14, 1949).
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ities," or Mr. Barron and Judge Holtzoff have been surreptitiously head-
noting cases for the West Publishing Company for quite a while. Which-
ever happens to be the case (I incline to the former interpretation), the
fact remains that a lawyer who has previously subscribed to the reporter
systems and the Federal Digest is now being asked to pay for the same thing,
or part of the same thing, the third time around. This may be a charm, as
the saying goes, but it can become awfully expensive.
There are many other features about this book which fortunately are as
rare as they are undesirable. The table of contents, for example, has no page
numbers on it. This is a unique feature in my limited experience. The table
in fact is only a guide to chapter headings, and the point at which each chap-
ter begins must be discovered by leafing through the pages. Once you have
found the lead page in the chapter, you have also stumbled upon a section-
by-section breakdown of the subject matter; but the page numbers are
again withheld with a kind of exasperating and promiscuous coyness making
the whole thing a sort of seventh veil proposition. Should the reader play
the game all the way and find the page on which the discussion of any given
rule is commenced, he may also find a footnote dealing with prior amend-
ments to its text; but he will search in vain for anything resembling Professor
Moore's step-by-step history of each rule from its inception.
Another undesirable feature is that of calculated citation restriction.
Except in Supreme Court cases and those in the bankruptcy field, the
reader is cited only to the publisher's reports (Federal Supplement, Federal
Reporter, and Federal Rules Decisions). So far as I can determine, the
Callaghan Company's excellent Federal Rules Service is never cited except
where the matter cannot be helped, as in cases where a report or summary of
the Advisory Committee, containing such citations, is itself quoted. This
is a rank disservice to those who are sufficiently careful about federal pro-
cedure to use the Rules Service, for they need seldom seek case material
anywhere else. It is fast, printed weekly, and in one place collects cases
which can otherwise be located (at least in my own experience) only in a
volume which is invariably being used by someone else seeking the "sub-
stantive law."
All in all, the Barron and Holzoff seems to me not to be a treatise at all,
but rather a collection of rules, excerpts, phrases, and statements which
mark it as a combination digest and handy practice manual. I do not see
how it can properly be cited by the judiciary as representing an extensive
and considered summary of existing law, let alone proposed changes, because
the background material and thoroughgoing discussion which should char-
acterize a treatise are not complete. Put differently, the text is often arbi-
trary in its conclusions rather than explanatory. Compare Moore's Federal
Practice as a general proposition. I believe that the B & H contains very
few erroneous statements in the text itself; its faults lie instead in what
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might be analogized to nonfeasance rather than misfeasance. Unfortunately,
the reader must be extremely cautious about accepting any flat statement
in the text as wholly accurate without doing some scouting around for
qualifications which may be several pages away. And if he happens to be
looking for supporting cases, he is not likely to find as many in the B & H
as he would in the M2foore or the Cyclopedia.
Mr. Barron and Judge Holtzoff have been leaders in the revision of the
criminal code. The field is more open for contributions there than is the
field of civil procedure. It is to be hoped that this factor will lead the authors
closer to a degree of perfection in some of the many subsequent volumes.
ROBERT DONWORTHt
SL.L.B. Yale Law School, June, 1950.
